

Who gets the title of “Most Fucked over Country of the Last Half Century?” Afghanistan has to be in the running. So does Rwanda. But it’s very easy to make the case for Cambodia. Start with five years of military dictatorship from 1970-1975, accompanied by civil war and American bombing. (For a couple of those years, the bombing was particularly heavy because Cambodia was not a signatory of the Paris Peace Accords and the US military didn’t have any place else to bomb.) On April 17, the Khmer Rouge arrived in Phnom Penh and, before the day was out, started evacuating the city. Within three days, the population of the city, someplace between one and two million on the morning of April 17 (much of that consisting of refugees from the American bombing) was down to between 1000 and 20000, all Khmer Rouge functionaries. The Khmer Rouge years (Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-79) were an experiment in radical egalitarianism, probably inspired by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, gone dramatically bad. Rice shortages, the forced relocation of city people to the countryside, a campaign against expert privilege (including doctors and possibly engineers), the elimination of Western medicine, and some political executions resulted in well over a million deaths, by some estimates nearly two million deaths, in a population of about eight million. So far as I can tell, starvation and a lack of medical care, rather than executions, accounted for the majority of deaths. I haven’t seen any estimates but my guess is that the executions were under 10%. But this, you might say, is moral nit picking and, indeed, it is. The Khmer Rouge years are astonishing but so are the years since, albeit in a different way. Cambodia was “liberated” in 1979 by an invading Vietnamese Army. (Remember that Viet Nam was a Soviet ally and Cambodia an ally of China, which promptly but briefly invaded Viet Nam after Viet Nam invaded Cambodia). Now, the Cambodians did not and do not like Viet Nam or the Viet Namese—long squabbles over rights to the Mekong exacerbated by bad treatment of Khmer minorities in Viet Nam and Viet minorities in Cambodia. On the couple of occasions we asked Vietnamese about Cambodians, their answers seemed proto-racist (“They’re darker with curly hair.”) and if we had talked longer or had better communication skills I would probably be comfortable dropping the ”proto” part. When we asked Cambodians about Vietnamese, the dislike was equally palpable: “They’re taking our jobs” which was far worse than anything anybody had to say about Americans who, whatever our country might have done in the past, now spent money in Cambodia. In any event, the Viet Namese imposed Communist regime (as distinct from the Khmer rouge Cambodian Communists) stayed in power for a decade before UN supervised elections. But, during this time, the Khmer Rouge continued to operate, mostly on the Thai border and with Thai, American, and Chinese support—a weird ménage a trios if ever there was one—because each dislike the Soviet Union (and therefore Viet Nam) than they disliked each other. The UN supervised election was won by the party of King Sihanouk and established a constitutional monarchy. Sihanouk promptly installed his son, the head of his party not as prime minister but as co-prime minister with one Hun Sen, the head of the Viet Nam backed communist party that had been the runner up in the election. Fast forward a couple of years and Hun Sen is no longer a communist, so far as I can tell, but does manage a coup in which he gets rid of the Sihanouk son. Hun Sen is still in power and has managed to combine the worst of communism and capitalism: limited civil liberties with plenty of poverty, low rates of education, high rates of corruption and massive inequality.
Phnom Penh is now repopulated, sort of. The downtown is organized along a wide boulevard, filled with embassies and other impressive looking building but largely empty of people, and the water front. The water front is filled with restaurants, hotels and stores. Some of the restaurants and hotels look very modern, in a W sort of way, which makes sense given that nothing is more than 20 years old. But the waterfront is also lined with beggars, men without legs (they all say they lost them in land mine accidents) and women with infant children asleep by their sides. It is a public display of poverty unlike anything we had seen in Viet Nam, Laos or Thailand. When we drove out of town—to the Killing Fields—much of the city began to look like a movie set, with houses, just like in a real city, but with empty fields stretching back behind them.
The tourist attractions in Phnom Penh are the Royal Palace, built by the French for the king around 1900, a kind of Bangkok Royal Palace lite, and torture. Right, torture. We went, as, so far as we know, does every other Westerner visiting PP to the killing fields and to S-21. The killing fields are not a metaphor (as, I think, the term was used in the movie of that name). They are a place—there may be several, even many, similar other such places—where the Khmer Rouge took political prisoners, a term used very broadly as it included, most dramatically, even infant children, to be executed. The place, fields, maybe a couple of acres, on the outskirts of Phnom Penh where a series of mass graves were found in 1979, is now marked by a small museum and a glass tower enclosing, on various levels, clothing found beside the grave and skulls. (In this case, by the way, the pictures actually do more than justice. The tower itself is not all the impressive and the various tiers, basically wooden shelves, mitigate some of the horror that we would have otherwise felt on seeing skulls piled 20 feet high.) S-21 is the former middle school, close to downtown Phnom Penh that was used as a prison and interrogation area for political prisoners, a weigh station en route to the killing fields. It is now a museum, mostly displaying pictures taken by the Khmer Rouge themselves of the roughly 20,000 prisoners who passed through, only a handful of whom survived. The picture of a tourist bus just outside a barbed wire fence is from S-21.
Nobody denies that massive numbers died during the Khmer Rouge years. This isn’t Brazil, as my brother describes. Quite the reverse: Peple are absolutely preoccupied with the past. Just about anyone over 35 or 40 has a story to tell about parents or other relatives lost and just about everyone we talked to willingly told his story, usually in what seemed to us a remarkably calm, emotionally flat voice. (Admittedly, we did not meet any rural people or, for that matter, even talk to many women.) What’s weird, though, is that in the insistence to document there is an almost absolute refusal to explain. At the Killing Fields, one plaque contains a sentence saying that Pol Pot (the head of the KR) should have examined the failures of his economic policy rather than blaming foreigners. (Sounds like it was written by someone pro Viet Nam.) Another couple of plaques showed the structure of the Communist party leadership in the late 70’s but made no effort to connect anything about Communism to the “genocide.” A third plaque, outside the building, next to a tree that was apparently used to bash babies to death, was the angriest statement we saw—apparently written by a Buddhist, it seemed to blame what happened on evil, a concept I do not find particularly useful. (Is it a Buddhist concept? No idea.) At S-21 the efforts to document were intense—picture after picture, but with no commentary and even less effort to explain than at the Killing Fields. No place was there any mention of the American bombing, no place was there any mention of the tensions with Viet Nam (except to note the part of Viet Nam in ending the Khmer Rouge regime), and certainly no place was there any effort to think about radical egalitarianism and what it meant. Moreover, there even seems to be a reluctance to talk about the Khmer Rouge. Time after time we heard people say that Pol Pot did this or Pol Pot did that (including in a little town on the Tonle Sap that it is unlikely Pol Pot ever visited). Occasionally we saw references to the “Pol Pot clique” but that’s about as close to a social analysis as anyone got. Pol Pot was a real person who seems to have turned into a myth. Somebody (maybe our driver to the killing Fields?) told us that his son doesn’t believe the stories—just like American kids learn to show they’re grown up by saying there’s no Santa Claus, except, of course., that there was a real Pol Pot and he was the anti-Santa Claus. Nobody even asks how many deaths were the result of purges, how many the result of famine, how many the result of civil war, how many the result of the disappearance of conventional medical care for four years. Now, I sort of understand this reluctance: It’s dangerous. Even after the Vietnamese invasion, the Khmer rouge didn’t disappear. Some defected to the new regime and were greeted more or less warmly. Even Pol Pot himself remained at large until 1997, and then only to be overturned by a coup within the remaining Khmer rouge itself a month before his death (possibly from natural causes). Many Khmer rouge operatives and even some leaders have now been reintegrated into Cambodian society. Easier to demonize—quite literally—Pol Pot than to confront what happened. Maybe it makes sense, but I doubt it. Where are the truth and reconciliation commissions when we need them?


